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Summary
he New York City Working Group on School Transformation brought together
education practitioners, school reformers, policy-makers, advocates, and parent
and student leaders to propose alternatives to the school closings policy of the
New York City Department of Education (DOE). (See the list of Working Group mem-
bers in Appendix 1.) The group was initiated by the New York City Coalition for Educa-
tional Justice and coordinated by the Annenberg Institute for School Reform following the
fall 2011 conference Effective Alternatives to School Closings: Transforming Struggling
Schools in New York City.1 This report presents the Working Group’s conclusions about
the limitations of school closings and a set of recommendations for systemic responses to
the needs of struggling schools.
The Working Group believes that the Bloomberg Administration’s school closing policy
has not and cannot successfully address the needs of the system’s struggling schools and
the students enrolled in them. The administration has yet to articulate a convincing ration-
ale for why particular schools should be closed or explain why it has failed to launch effec-
tive interventions to improve schools instead of closing them. The Working Group
believes the DOE has not met its responsibility to help students in the system’s struggling
schools and has instead exacerbated the challenges faced by many of the schools it has
subsequently targeted for closing. The Working Group calls for the DOE to refocus its
reform efforts on a strategic intervention – a Success Initiative zone – to improve the sys-
tem’s struggling schools as well as on building instructional capacity across the city sys-
tem. Therefore, the Working Group recommends: 
strategic intervention: a success initiative
The DOE should:
• constitute a Success Initiative as a pilot effort to provide targeted support to the city’s 
struggling schools. 
• identify a set of research-corroborated improvement strategies employed within the 
city system, as well across the country, which can be adapted by the Success Initiative
schools. 
• designate several high-performing city schools as professional development lab sites 
where teams from Success Initiative schools can observe best practices and develop
their own improvement strategies. 
• provide the resources and supports necessary to help the Success Initiative schools
develop improvement plans and should support the plans’ implementation by the
schools and their parent and community constituencies. 
• help Success Initiative schools that adapt similar strategies build networks of school
leaders and staffs to identify critical implementation problems and discuss how to
resolve them. 
• ask the city’s Independent Budget Office to assess the progress of the Success Initia-
tive’s schools and evaluate the effectiveness of the Success Initiative effort. 
T
1 The conference was
convened by the Coali-
tion for Educational 
Justice, the Urban Youth
Collaborative, and the
Alliance for Quality Edu-
cation and held at the
Bank Street College of
Education.
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systemic capacity building
The DOE should:
• no longer concentrate high-needs students in struggling schools. 
• develop interventions and supports to help all schools build their capacity to effec-
tively educate high-needs students.2
• define and promulgate school performance standards, especially those that might
require closure, and develop and implement an inspection system to provide early
warnings of deteriorating school performance.
• develop interventions to aid improvement in schools whose performance is deteriorat-
ing. School teams should adapt the DOE’s interventions to each school’s needs, and
parents and community constituencies should be included in the planning and imple-
mentation processes. 
Background 
ulfilling his pre-election promise, Mayor Bloomberg transformed the governance
and administration of public education in New York City. His department of edu-
cation (DOE) ended chronic teacher shortages and, with the help of new state
policies, assured the assignment of certified teachers in every classroom. The DOE has
provided schools with significantly more data about their students’ achievement and has
increased schools’ flexibility to use their fiscal and human resources. Moreover, recent
studies indicate that many of the new small schools created by the DOE are succeeding. 
But the mayor’s reforms are not without costs; they have marginalized parent and com-
munity voice and eliminated educator and citizen participation in education decision mak-
ing. Moreover, though the administration insists that its reforms have produced dramatic
gains in student outcomes, recent evidence provides a sobering contrast to claims of sys-
temic progress. Consider, for example: 
• In 2009, the New York State Regents acknowledged that student scores on fourth- and
eighth-grade English language arts and math tests had been inflated and recalibrated
them downward, negating most of the test score gains recorded during the Bloomberg
administration. 
• In 2010 the Regents reported that very few of the city’s high school graduates – only
13 percent of Black and Latino students who had entered ninth grade four years earlier
– were prepared to succeed in college. 
• More than 50 percent of the city’s public school graduates at four-year colleges, and
nearly 80 percent at community colleges, are required to take remedial courses after
enrolling at City University of New York. 
• Since 2003, there has been no significant reduction in the achievement gap separating
New York City’s African American and Latino students from White students on the
National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) testing program. 
F
Moreover, the city’s struggling schools’ sector is expanding, and many of the struggling
schools are performing far below state proficiency levels: 
• In more than 200 of the city’s elementary and middle schools, less than 25 percent of
the students are achieving proficiency on the annual English language arts exam.3
• In more than 200 of the city’s high schools, less than 50 percent of the students are
graduating with a Regents’ diploma. 
• In more than 70 percent of the city’s high schools, less than 25 percent of the students
are graduating college-ready, according to the state’s new standards.
This growing number of struggling schools raises questions about the effectiveness of
Mayor Bloomberg’s school improvement policies – choice, autonomy, competition, incen-
tives, and sanctions – because such market-based strategies have not helped the city’s
schools develop their capacity to improve. Instead, the Working Group believes, these
strategies have marginalized and isolated educators’ knowledge and experience and
emphasized structural rather than instructional solutions. Michael Fullan made this point
in an analysis that compared the dominant school reform strategies employed in the U.S.
to reform strategies used by nations that outperform the U.S. with international assess-
ments.4 Fullan argues that current U.S. reforms rely on the wrong drivers – “deliberate pol-
icy forces that have little chance of achieving the desired result” and defines four wrong
drivers pervasive in school reform efforts throughout the U.S.: 
• Using test results to reward or sanction schools and reward or punish teachers.
• Promoting individual rather than group solutions to issues of teacher and leadership
quality.
• Investing in technology rather than improving instruction.
• Investing in fragmented reforms rather than integrated whole-system strategies.
These wrong drivers are the linchpins of the mayor’s school reforms. His department of
education, for example, relies primarily on standardized testing results to identify unac-
ceptable student outcomes across the city’s schools. But identifying poor performance
without providing a systemic approach to improvement has generated a disruptive cycle
of school closure – nearly 140 schools have been closed, or slated for closure, since 2003,
when the Bloomberg Administration took office. The DOE has actually begun to close
some of the schools it recently opened; nearly half the schools most recently closed by the
DOE were opened during the past ten years. 
If, as Fullan argues, districts should develop their schools’ capacity to improve instruction
and student achievement, rather than closing them, what alternative strategies should the
DOE employ? Although it seems unlikely that Mayor Bloomberg will alter the school sys-
tem’s reform directions, the city’s mayoral candidates and the broader community must
consider adopting new education strategies, given the large number of struggling schools
the new mayor will inherit in less than two years.
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2 See Appendix 3: The
Parthenon Report.
3 This finding is based on the
outcomes of New York
State’s standardized testing
program. The Working Group
is not convinced that the
state’s testing constitutes an
adequate or appropriate
assessment system.
4 Fullan, M. Choosing the
Wrong Drivers for Whole 
System Reform, Centre for
Strategic Education Seminar
Series Paper No. 204 (East
Melbourne, Australia: Centre
for Strategic Education,
2011). Fullan is Professor
Emeritus of the Ontario Insti-
tute for Studies in Education
(OISE) of the University of
Toronto and a renowned
authority on international
education reform.
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Fullan argues that to significantly improve its struggling schools, the U.S. must adopt
capacity-building strategies used by countries that outperform the U.S. on international
measures of achievement: “The right drivers – capacity building, group work, instruction,
and systemic solutions – are effective because they work directly on changing the culture
of school systems (values, norms, skills, practices, relationships).”
While the DOE has honed its choice and accountability reforms, it has not focused on
implementing these “right drivers.” Instead, it has far too often left schools to struggle on
their own to improve their instructional capacity. Worse, the DOE has allowed the num-
bers of high-needs students in many struggling schools to significantly increase in the
years before the DOE targeted them for closure.
The DOE Exacerbates the Challenges 
in Schools It Subsequently Closes
he 140 schools the DOE has closed since 2003 served large numbers of the city’s
highest need students. Those closed or closing schools had higher percentages of
students eligible for free and reduced price lunch (a proxy for poverty), higher per-
centages of students with disabilities, and higher percentages of English language learners
(ELLs) than the school system as a whole, as Figure 1 shows.
Subsequent analyses indicate
that the twenty-three schools
most recently targeted for clo-
sure had higher percentages of
special education students, low-
income students, and students
over-age for grade than the sys-
tem as a whole. Moreover, the
middle schools and high schools
recently targeted for closure had,
on entry, higher proportions of
students whose English language
arts and math skills were far
below state proficiency levels
than the citywide average.5
The data in Figure 2 demon-
strate that schools targeted for
closure served larger percentages
of high-needs students with sig-
T
sources:New York City Board of Education, 2002–2006 Annual
School Report Cards; New York City Department of Education
(NYCDOE), Comprehensive Education Plan 2007; NYCDOE,
Progress Reports 2008–2011.
notes: Figures above represent phase-out year 1 averages (2002–
2011) across the 117 closed schools.
figure 1. 
Demographics of the 117 Schools Closed Since 2003
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nificant academic challenges than students in the city system as a whole. Moreover, the
DOE has too often failed to provide the necessary instructional support for struggling
schools before deciding to close them.6 Worse, analyses of the schools beginning their
phase-out in 2011 indicates that in the five years prior to the announcement of the deci-
sion to close, the DOE significantly increased the percentages of high-needs students in
those schools, as Figure 3 below shows. 
Several schools targeted for closure experienced particularly dramatic increases in their
high-needs student populations in the five years prior to phase-out and the first year of
their phase-out (see Figure 4). New Day Academy, for example, saw an almost 50 percent
5 An analysis by the Independ-
ent Budget Office reached
similar conclusions: New
York City Independent Budget
Office, Statistical Profile of
Schools on the DOE’s 2012 
Closure List (New York: Inde-
pendent Budget Office,
2012).
6 See, for example, Advocates
for Children’s report on the
closure of Tilden High School
and the dispersion of the
school’s bilingual program:
Advocates for Children and
the Asian American Legal
Defense and Education Fund,
Empty Promises: A Case Study
of Restructuring and Exclusion
of English Language Learners
in Two Brooklyn High Schools
(New York: Advocates for
Children and the Asian Amer-
ican Legal Defense and Edu-
cation Fund, 2009). See also:
New York City Department of
Education, School Disclosure
Discharge Reporting (New
York: New York City Depart-
ment of Education, 2012).
Closing
Schools Citywide
Special Education (2010) 17.0% 14.0%
Self-Contained Special Education (2010) 8.0% 5.0%
Eligible for Free and Reduced Price Lunch (2010) 82.0% 74.0%
Students Entering High School Over-age for Grade (2010) 20.0% 5.0%
figure 2. 
Demographics in the 23 Schools Most Recently Targeted for Closure
sources: New York City Department of Education (NYCDOE), Comprehensive Education Plan 2010; NYC-
DOE, New York City Results on the New York State ELA & Math Tests, Grades 3–8 (2010-2011); NYCDOE, Grad-
uation Results, 2001–2006 Cohorts; New York State Education Department, Information and Reporting Services,
Total Cohort Graduation Rate and Enrollment Outcome Summaries.
5 Years Prior 
to Phase-out
Announced
(2006)
Year 1 of 
Phase-out
(2011)
Special Education 14.0% 18.0%
Free and Reduced Price Lunch 75.0% 79.0%
Homeless 1.0% 4.0%
English Language Learners 11.0% 14.0%
Students Entering High School Over-age for Grade* 9.0% 28.0%
Gr. 3–8 Proficient and Above in English Language Arts 34.6% 22.1%
Gr. 3–8 Proficient and Above in Math 37.8% 26.6%
figure 3. 
Increases in High-Needs Students and Decreases in Achievement at Schools Starting
their Phase-out in 2011  
sources: New York City Board of Education, 2006 Annual School Report Cards; New York City
Department of Education, Comprehensive Education Plan 2006 and 2011.
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increase in its special education students and 60 percent rise in its ELLs. Global Enterprise
High School’s special education and ELL populations doubled, while at IS 231, special edu-
cation students and ELLs increased by almost 60 percent. At Grace Dodge Career and
Technical Education High School and Samuel Gompers Career and Technical Education
High School, two schools on the most recent closure list, 47 percent of incoming ninth-
graders had posted eighth-grade reading scores in the lowest third citywide in 2003. By
2011, at least 61 percent of both schools’ entering students fell into that category.7
The instructional challenges these schools face are often heightened by the DOE’s ten-
dency to assign over-the-counter students8 to struggling high schools. In the 2010-2011
school year, for example, Gateway School for Environmental Research and Technology
was assigned 110 over-the-counter students, or 16 percent of its total enrollment. Gateway
School was subsequently targeted for closure in 2012. 
As school closings have multiplied across the past few years, critics have charged that DOE
student assignment policies have contributed to the poor school performance that the DOE
subsequently cites in targeting schools for closing.9 The data summarized above indicate
that the charges have validity. Therefore the Working Group calls for the DOE to stop con-
centrating high-needs students in struggling schools.10 Instead, the DOE should develop
interventions and supports to help all schools build their capacity to effectively educate
their high-needs students, through policies such as the Success Initiative outlined below.
5 Years Prior 
to Phase-out
Announced
(2006)
Year 1 of 
Phase-out
(2011)
New Day Academy
Special Education 15.0% 22.0%
Free and Reduced Price Lunch 81.0% 88.0%
English Language Learners 7.0% 12.0%
Global Enterprise 
High School
Special Education 9.0% 17.0%
Free and Reduced Price Lunch 77.0% 82.0%
English Language Learners 8.0% 16.0%
IS 231 
Magnetech 2000
Special Education 11.0% 17.0%
Free and Reduced Price Lunch 63.0% 78.0%
English Language Learners 2.0% 5.0%
sources: New York City Board of Education, 2006 Annual School Report Cards; New York City
Department of Education, Comprehensive Education Plan 2006 and 2011.
figure 4. 
Percent of High-Needs Students at Schools Beginning Their Phase-out in 2011
Compared to 2006 
7 Grace Dodge High School
enrolled a uniquely challeng-
ing student body. “Approxi-
mately 25 percent of the
student populations are teen
parents … which contributes
to the poor attendance rates
at the school,” the DOE
reported when applying for
$3 million from the federal
government to turn Grace
Dodge around. Yet when the
DOE recently announced
Grace Dodge’s closure, its
explanation never mentioned
the school’s high number of
teen parents but emphasized
the school’s very low atten-
dance rate as a cause for ter-
mination.
8 Over-the-counter students are
students who were not
assigned through the sys-
tem’s high school choice
admissions process or were
new registrants to the school
system in September.
9 See, for example: New York
City Independent Budget
Office, Demographics, Per-
formance, Resources: Schools
Proposed for Closing Com-
pared with Other City Schools,
January School Brief (New
York: New York City Inde-
pendent Budget Office,
2011); Urban Youth Collabo-
rative, “No Closer to College:
NYC High School Students
Call for Real Transformation,
Not School Closings” (New
York: Urban Youth Collabora-
tive, 2011); Phillips, A., “Stu-
dents and Staff Say
Washington Irving Was Set
Up to Fail” (New York Times,
December 20, 2011). See also
the Parthenon Report
described in Appendix 3.
10 See Appendix 3, The
Parthenon Report, for a
description of a similar rec-
ommendation.
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Strategic Intervention 
What the DOE Should Do to Improve Struggling Schools
he DOE should constitute a Success Initiative to concentrate resources and supports
to improve the system’s struggling schools.11 As part of the Success Initiative, the
DOE would identify a set of research-corroborated school improvement strategies,
developed within the city system as well as across the country, which would be adapted by
the Success Initiative schools. (Appendix 4 offers an initial set of instructional and support
strategies that research suggests have improved schools in their local settings.) Each Success
Initiative school would choose a specific strategy to adapt and integrate into its instructional
improvement plan; the DOE would help the schools determine the interventions that 
would best support their improvement efforts by facilitating visits to schools using successful
reform strategies. The DOE would designate several high-performing city schools as profes-
sional development lab sites where teams from Success Initiative schools could observe best
practices and develop their own improvement strategies. The DOE would organize the
resources, assistance, and support necessary to help Success Initiative schools work with 
parents and community constituencies to effectively implement their plans. 
The DOE would help Success Initiative schools build networks of school leaders and staffs
implementing similar strategies; these networks would identify critical implementation prob-
lems and explore strategies to resolve them. The DOE would ask the city’s Independent
Budget Office to assess the progress of the Success Initiative’s schools and evaluate the effec-
tiveness of the Success Initiative effort. (See Appendix 2 for a brief discussion of how the
Success Initiatives’s costs might be met.)
Building Instructional Capacity 
What the DOE Should Do to Minimize the Number of
Struggling Schools
he DOE should employ a combination of policy levers and improvement inter-
ventions to build instructional capacity throughout the school system. The DOE
should significantly reduce the number of the city’s struggling schools by ensuring:
• High and rigorous expectations for students and schools.
•  Flexible fiscal, staffing, and professional development resources, as well as expanded
learning time to realize high expectations for all students.
• That all schools have effective leaders capable of building and supporting collaborative
teaching staffs. 
• That all resources are distributed equitably to schools in accordance with their student
needs. 
T
11 How schools should be
selected for the Success 
Initiative is an issue the 
Working Group has deferred.
Since many researchers 
have demonstrated that 
the administration’s current
accountability metrics are too
unreliable to be used with
confidence, new assessment
methods, based on multiple
criteria, seem necessary to
ensure the reliability and
transparency of school selec-
tion. 
T
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• That all choice and assignment policies do not assign disproportionate percentages of
high-needs students to struggling schools.
• That school evaluation and assessment policies are based on multiple measures that are
rigorous, diverse, transparent, relevant, and equitable.
• Early interventions identify negative school performance trends and provide systemic
supports for school improvement.12
Therefore, the Working Group recommends that the DOE define and promulgate school-
level performance standards, especially those that might require closure, and develop 
and implement an inspection system that provides early warnings of deteriorating school
performance. The DOE should develop strategic interventions to help schools whose 
performance is deteriorating and involve parents and community constituencies in those
interventions as part of ongoing efforts to improve school performance. 
Conclusion: The Way Forward
or the past ten years, the Bloomberg administration has worked assiduously to
reform the city’s education system. But its over-reliance on the wrong reform driv-
ers has eroded systemic instructional capacity and marginalized the voices and
experience of educators and parent and community constituencies. The administration’s
reform strategies – choice, empowerment, autonomy and accountability, technology, and,
in particular, school closings – need to be countered by a comprehensive focus on building
instructional capacity in individual schools and across the entire school system. The fail-
ures of the DOE’s school closings policy highlighted in this report, as well as the Working
Group’s recommendations for how to improve struggling schools, should be articulated in
education debates across the city as the 2013 municipal elections approach.
How the DOE can best help struggling schools improve will vary across this enormous
system of nearly 1,600 schools. The Working Group has recommended adapting school-
and district-supported capacity-building strategies based on successful efforts in New York
City and in other districts across the country. Our central conclusion is that the DOE
must develop the capacity to support improvement efforts differentiated for the specific
needs of struggling students and schools, just as teachers must develop their capacity to
differentiate instruction for students with varying needs. The ultimate goal of teaching
individual students is to develop successful learners and thinkers; similarly, instead of clos-
ing struggling individual schools, the DOE’s overarching goal should be to develop its sys-
temic capacities to improve them. 
12 In a recent study of success-
ful turnaround efforts in 
low-performing California
schools, WestEd and the
American Institutes for
Research (AIR) defined a set
of key instructional strategies
used by the turnaround
schools’ principals that were
very similar to the list above.
See: American Institutes for
Research, Turnaround Schools
in California: Who Are They
and What Strategies Do They
Use? (Washington, DC: Amer-
ican Institutes of Research,
2011). See also: Herman, R.,
Dawson, P., Dee, T., Greene,
J., Maynard, R., Redding, S.,
and Darwin, M., Turning
Around Chronically Low-Per-
forming Schools: A Practice
Guide (Washington, DC:
National Center for Education
Evaluation and Regional
Assistance, Institute of Edu-
cation Sciences, U.S. Depart-
ment of Education, 2008) for
a similar set of recommenda-
tions for improvement strate-
gies.
F
New York City Working Group on School Transformation | 9
Members of the Working Group on 
School Transformation
Warren Simmons* 
Executive Director, the Annenberg Institute for School Reform at Brown University
Zakiyah Ansari*
Advocacy Director, Alliance for Quality Education  
Parent Leader, New York City Coalition for Educational Justice     
Ruddie Daley
Parent Leader, New York City Coalition for Educational Justice 
Carmen Fariña
Former New York City Schools Deputy Chancellor
Maria Fernandez
Senior Coordinator, New York City Urban Youth Collaborative
Norm Fruchter
Senior Policy Analyst, Annenberg Institute for School Reform at Brown University
Jo Haines
Executive Director, Everyone Reading, Inc. 
John Jackson
President, Schott Foundation for Public Education
Pedro Noguera
Professor of Education, New York University 
Director, New York University Metro Center for Urban Education
Christine Rowland
Teacher, Christopher Columbus High School 
Jon Snyder
Dean, Bank Street College of Education
Kim Sweet
Executive Director, Advocates for Children of New York
Philip Weinberg
Principal, High School of Telecommunications Arts
*Co-chairs
APPENDIX 1
10 | Recommendations to the NYCDOE from New York City Working Group on School Transformation 
A Note on Costs
he Working Group’s recommendation on per-school costs in the Success Initiative
depends on the mix of intervention strategies employed to improve particular
schools. Per-school costs in the Chancellor’s District, a systemic intervention from
1996 to 2003 to improve sixty struggling schools removed from their community school 
districts, were approximately $1 million per school.
Similar per-school costs for the Success Initiative schools could be met by the U.S. Depart-
ment of Education’s School Improvement Grants (SIG) program, which awards up to 
$2 million per school undergoing one of the department’s four turnaround models.14 The
amount of the grant award is driven by each school’s student enrollment. 
Additionally, the New York City Department of Education’s (DOE) Fair Student Funding
formula could be utilized to subsidize the improvement efforts of Success Initiative
schools. When the DOE implemented its Fair Student Funding formula in 2007, it capped
schools at less than 100 percent of the funding the formula recommended; the larger the
school, the higher the amount of funding the DOE withheld, since the formula is driven
by the number of students enrolled in each school. Allocating the struggling schools in the
Success Initiative their full funding under the Fair Student Funding formula would, in com-
bination with the federal SIG grants, provide sufficient funding to carry out the improve-
ment efforts this report recommends in most, if not all, the Success Initiative schools.
In terms of the number of schools selected for the Success Initiative, the Working Group
suggests that a combination of the struggling schools currently receiving SIG grants, as
well as those schools designated as Persistently Low Achieving (PLA) schools by the New
York State Education Department, would become eligible for inclusion. This would pro-
duce fifty to sixty schools eligible for the Success Initiative as a pilot project. The Working
Group further suggests that each school selected for the Success Initiative remain in the
Initiative for at least three years.15
APPENDIX 2
T
14 The use of SIG grants for
Success Initiative schools
obviously depends on the
continuation of the U.S.
Department of Education’s
School Improvement Grant
program.
15 For a range of fiscal sources
available for funding ex-
tended learning time, see
also J.S. Curry and E. Morgan,
A Fiscal Map for Expanded
Learning Time (ELT), a TASC
Policy Brief (New York: The
After School Corporation,
2011).
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The Parthenon Report
he Parthenon Group is a Cambridge, Massachusetts, consulting firm contracted 
by the New York City Department of Education (DOE) in 2005 to analyze the
performance of the school system’s high schools and make recommendations 
for their improvement. One aspect of the Parthenon Group’s report analyzed the effects
on high schools of a combination of large school size and a concentration of students 
with Level 1 and low Level 2 eighth-grade English language arts and math test scores.
Parthenon found that in high schools of more than 1,500 students and with more than 40
percent of the student population scoring Level 1 or low Level 2 in both English language
arts and math, the odds of students graduating were significantly reduced. 
The Parthenon report put forward several strategies to reduce this peer effect that signifi-
cantly lowers graduation rates for all students in schools with such concentrations. Among
their recommendations was that the DOE alter their student assignment policies to
reduce the concentration of Level 1 and low Level 2 students in large struggling high
schools, a strategy that this report’s recommendations have taken up. Parthenon also rec-
ommended closing or dividing large schools and starting new smaller schools “to absorb
displaced students – particularly low-proficiency students.” They also suggested that the
DOE identify large high schools with high concentrations of Level 1 and low Level 2 stu-
dents that had achieved above average graduation rates in spite of their concentration of
low skills students. Parthenon further recommended that the DOE conduct research into
the practices of these beat-the-odds schools to determine what instructional strategies led
to their successes. (This recommendation by Parthenon is similar to the establishment of
the professional development lab schools that the Working Group report recommends.)
The DOE had begun to close large high schools and open new small schools before the
Parthenon report was issued, though the extent to which the new small schools have
absorbed the students displaced from the closing schools has been fiercely contested. But
the DOE has not acted on Parthenon’s recommendations to alter student assignment poli-
cies to reduce the concentrations of high-needs students in large high schools. Instead, in
many struggling schools, the DOE has significantly increased the percentages of high-
needs students and then targeted those schools for closure. Parthenon’s recommendation
to identify large schools with concentrations of high-needs students that show achieve-
ment outcomes significantly higher than predicted, and then determine what school prac-
tices helped to produce those outcomes, has also not been acted on by the DOE.
APPENDIX 3
T
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School Improvement Programs that Success 
Initiative Schools Could Adapt
programs in new york city
APPENDIX 4
CHILDREN’S AID SOCIETY (CAS) COMMUNITY SCHOOLS 
Scope Model Outcomes
CAS works
with seventeen
New York City
schools.
Community schools mobilize and coordinate a
broad range of resources to support student suc-
cess. Since 1992, CAS has developed a community
schools model based on a “developmental triangle”
of strong academic instruction, expanded learning
opportunities, and integrated services to remove
barriers to learning. Most CAS community schools
are open six days a week well into the evening and
incorporate a comprehensive range of supports. In
addition to its New York City work, in 1994 CAS
established the National Center for Community
Schools to facilitate the development of community
schools based on the New York City model. The Cen-
ter has advised more than 15,000 community
schools in the U.S. and internationally.
According to CAS, their
community schools have
higher student and teacher
attendance rates, more
appropriate rates of refer-
ral to special education,
higher parent involvement,
and higher student
achievement than demo-
graphically similar schools. 
Web
www.childrensaidsociety.org
INSTITUTE FOR STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT (ISA)
Scope Model Outcomes
ISA works with
eighty schools
in six states,
including
thirty-three in
New York City.
ISA works with the National Center for
Restructuring Education, Schools and
Teaching (NCREST) at Teachers College,
Columbia University to restructure high
schools into small, college-preparatory
learning communities. The model is built
on eight principles: a college preparatory
curriculum for all students; “distributed
counseling,” including teacher-led advi-
sories of fifteen to eighteen students that
remain together for four years; ISA coaches
who work on-site; teacher and counselor
teams that follow students for four years;
ongoing professional development; an
extended school day and year; parent
involvement; and ongoing program moni-
toring and improvement.
A 2010 evaluation of ISA schools in
New York City by the Academy for
Educational Development found
that students in ISA schools had
higher credit accumulation and
grade promotion rates, better
attendance, higher graduation
rates, and stronger college prepara-
tion than a demographically
matched comparison group. Grad-
uates of ISA schools have much
higher retention rates than the
national average, particularly Black
and Latino graduates.
Web
www.studentachievement.org
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THE AFTER SCHOOL CORPORATION (TASC) EXPAND/ED MODEL
Scope Model Outcomes
TASC
works with
a network
of seven-
teen New
York City
schools.
ExpandED Schools offer an expanded learning day
delivered by a blended school-and-community
workforce. Building from an evidence base of
high-quality after-school programs and successful
schools with a longer learning day, TASC re-engi-
neers schools to give students more time and
opportunities to learn and helps them develop
resilience to withstand environmental stress and
economic hardship. The model has four core ele-
ments common to every ExpandED School:
• More learning time for a balanced curriculum:
Schools partner with community organizations
to re-engineer the school day to deliver at least
1,600 hours of learning time, an increase of
more than 35 percent compared to the average
American school. 
• School-community partnership and staffing: The
principal, teachers, and other school staff join
forces with community educators from a lead
partnering organization. They operate from a
common set of goals and share accountability
for student outcomes.
• Engaging and personalized instruction: Students
benefit from individualized instruction in small
groups facilitated by a blended staff of teachers
and community educators who are deployed
across the longer learning day.
• Sustainable cost model: To achieve cost-effec-
tive, sustainable reform, ExpandED Schools
adhere to a scalable cost model, using an incre-
mental cost of $1,600 per student in kinder-
garten through eighth grade.
According to external evalua-
tions, students in schools imple-
menting the ExpandED model
with fidelity showed significantly
greater attendance than students
in peer schools, and 85 percent
of teachers reported that
expanded learning time
improved learning for partici-
pants. 
According to TASC’s own stud-
ies, between 2009 and 2010 and
2010 and 2011, schools with
expanded learning time
increased their math proficiency
level by 5.9 percentage points
compared to the citywide aver-
age of 3.3 points. Between 2009
and 2010 and 2010 and 2011,
schools with expanded learning
time gained 2.2 percentage
points in English language arts
compared to 1.5 points citywide.
Schools with the highest fidelity
to the ExpandED model showed
the best gains in percentage of
students meeting or exceeding
proficiency. ExpandED also
works with three schools in Balti-
more and three in New Orleans.
Web
www.tascorp.org
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TURNAROUND FOR CHILDREN
Scope Model Outcomes
Turnaround
currently works
with seventeen
New York City
schools and
three Washing-
ton, D.C.,
schools.
Turnaround for Children, founded in 2002,
implements a whole-school transformation
model that builds schools’ capacity to serve
high-needs students and students facing
issues stemming from poverty. The model
supports schools with high concentrations
of poor students to foster positive behaviors,
develop support systems within the school,
and connect students to community
resources. Turnaround partners with a
school for three-and-a-half years and deploys
a transformation team consisting of a proj-
ect director, an academic coach, and a social
work consultant. The model emphasizes
building schools’ capacities to implement
better practices and systems after direct sup-
port ends. Each participating school hires a
clinical worker who receives training from
Turnaround staff and works to coordinate
supports within and outside of the school. 
A 2008 evaluation by the American
Institutes of Research of five New
York City Turnaround schools
found that the schools experi-
enced a 51 percent reduction in
police-reported incidents and a 32
percent decrease in suspensions.
Teacher turnover declined by
three-quarters and teacher
absences by a third. According to
Turnaround, their New York City
partner schools showed gains in
math results equivalent to citywide
gains, as well as increases in Eng-
lish language arts outcomes
slightly better than the citywide
English language arts gains.
Web
www.turnaroundusa.org
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programs across the country
HIGH SCHOOLS THAT WORK (HSTW), 
A PROGRAM OF THE SOUTHERN REGIONAL EDUCATION BOARD (SREB)
Scope Model Outcomes
1,200 schools
in thirty states;
the SREB was
selected 
as an Educa-
tional Partner
Organization
(EPO) for
Grover Cleve-
land and Rich-
mond High
Schools in
New York. 
HStW combines a college preparatory
curriculum aligned to state standards
with a two-semester “double dose” of
core academic subjects for freshmen.
Career education is integrated through-
out the curriculum, and all upper-grade
students are expected to complete at
least one Advanced Placement, Interna-
tional Baccalaureate, or dual-credit
course. HStW schools assign each stu-
dent a single mentor for the duration 
of high school; involve parents in plan-
ning and monitoring their students’
progress, beginning in middle school;
and focus on critical transitions through
summer bridge programs and other
partnerships with postsecondary insti-
tutions. SREB provides technical assis-
tance visits, assessment tools, training
for school staff and leaders, and net-
working opportunities through state
and national conferences. 
An SREB evaluation compared urban
schools with high levels of implementa-
tion of the HStW to low- to moderate-
implementation schools between 2002
and 2004 found that students in high-
implementation schools were nearly
twenty percentage points more likely 
to meet the HStW performance targets
in English, thirteen percentage points
more likely to meet targets in math, and
eighteen percentage points more likely
to meet HStW targets in science. While
there has been limited external evalua-
tion of the HStW model, a 2002 meta-
analysis of comprehensive high school
reform models rated HStW as having
strong evidence of positive impact on
student achievement and relatively low
implementation costs.
Web
www.sreb.org/page/1078/high_
schools_that_work.html
MASSACHUSETTS EXPANDED LEARNING TIME INITIATIVE 
Scope Model Outcomes
The Initiative
works with
nineteen
schools in nine
Massachusetts
districts.
In 2005, the Massachusetts Department
of Education and the nonprofit group
Massachusetts 2020 launched the
Expanded Learning Time Initiative to pro-
vide grants to schools and districts to
expand learning time. Participating school
districts lengthen their school year by at
least 300 hours and receive technical
assistance, research, and policy in crafting
extended learning time opportunities. The
extra time is carefully balanced between
core academics, enrichment activities, and
time for teachers to plan and learn collab-
oratively. Each school partners with univer-
sities, community-based organizations,
and businesses to increase learning
opportunities. 
According to Massachusetts 2020, 
the percentage of Title I Expanded
Learning Time schools rated as
“high-growth” on the Massachusetts
Comprehensive Assessment System
is approximately double that of non-
Expanded Learning Time Title I
schools in both English language
arts and math. Teachers in Expanded
Learning Time schools report higher
satisfaction with the amount of time
available for instruction and for col-
laborative planning than teachers in
comparison schools.
Web
www.mass2020.org/node/3
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STRATEGIC LEARNING INITIATIVES (SLI)
Scope Model Outcomes
SLI works with
ten elementary
and middle
schools in
Chicago.
SLI developed the Focused Instruction Program
as a turnaround partner for ten failing schools in
Chicago, nine of which were slated for closure.
SLI worked with existing principals and teachers
to implement a structured, eight-step instruc-
tional process of frequent formative assess-
ment, differentiated instruction, and re-teaching
with rich professional development and collabo-
ration opportunities for teachers. Professional
development facilitators spend a full day a week
in each school. Frequent professional develop-
ment clinics focus on needs articulated by
school leaders during classroom observations.
The model includes curriculum workshops for
parents, led by other parents. Teachers, adminis-
trators, and parents work together on school
leadership teams to manage the reform.
A 2009 study of the Focused
Instruction Program validated
by the American Institutes of
Research found that after two
years, the ten SLI schools
improved on average at more
than three times the rate of
their improvement prior to
adopting the model. The
schools increased the percent-
age of students scoring at or
above proficiency in reading at
twice the rate of the city’s gains
for the same period.
Web
www.strategiclearning.org
STRATEGIC STAFFING INITIATIVE (SSI)
Scope Model Outcomes
SSI works with
twenty schools
in Charlotte-
Mecklenburg
(North Car-
olina) Public
Schools.
Starting with seven low-performing schools in
the 2008-2009 school year, SSI recruited experi-
enced principals to the schools and asked each
of them to assemble a team including an assis-
tant principal, behavioral specialist, literacy
coach, and up to five teachers with a demon-
strated record of producing academic gains.
SSI places the responsibility for designing and
implementing a reform strategy with each
school’s team and works to earn the trust of the
community through transparency of informa-
tion and strong communication. Principals and
teachers earn salary supplements, recruitment
bonuses, and retention bonuses for teachers
who stay in the school at least two years. 
According to the Aspen Insti-
tute, during the first year of
implementation, SSI schools
had gains in the percentage of
students rated proficient on
reading and math that
exceeded districtwide gains,
and their gains in science profi-
ciency were slightly below the
district average. Proficiency lev-
els across the twenty schools
had been declining in the years
prior to implementation.
Web
www.cms.k12.nc.us
New York City Working Group on School Transformation | 17
TALENT DEVELOPMENT (TD)
Scope Model Outcomes
TD works
with more
than 100
schools
nationally.
TD schools organize themselves into small learn-
ing communities led by teams of four to six teach-
ers, including a ninth-grade Success Academy and
career-themed academies in the upper grades. An
after-hours Twilight Academy serves students with
severe behavioral problems and provides credit-
recovery opportunities. Teams of four to six teach-
ers share the same students, to foster close
relationships and to allow extensive collaboration.
Block scheduling of ninety-minute periods allows
TD schools to provide a “double dose” of core sub-
jects, with accelerated “catch-up” courses in the
first semester and college-preparatory courses in
the second. Ninth-graders learn study and social
skills in a freshman seminar. Each TD school has a
school-based facilitator and a team of trained cur-
riculum coaches to work with existing school staff. 
TD’s newest initiative is Diplomas Now, a partner-
ship between TD, City Year, and Communities in
Schools. Diplomas Now supplements the core ele-
ments of the TD model with extensive socio-emo-
tional supports and an early-warning indicator
system. Mentors from City Year involve students in
before- and after-school programming, tutor strug-
gling students, and act as classroom assistants.
Communities in Schools conducts community
asset mapping to connect schools with community
services and provide intensive case-management
for individual students as needed. Diplomas Now
is the Educational Partnership Organization
selected to work with Newtown and Sheepshead
Bay High Schools in New York City.
A 2005 MDRC evaluation of five
low-performing TD high schools
in Philadelphia, endorsed by the
What Works Clearinghouse,
found that the model signifi-
cantly increased ninth-grade
attendance, credit accumula-
tion, and promotion rates and
that those gains persisted
throughout students’ careers.
These results were reproduced
with other cohorts as the model
spread to other schools across
the district.
Diplomas Now reports
improvements in attendance,
behavior, and course-passing in
the first year of implementation. 
Web
www.talentdevelopmentschools.
com
www.diplomasnow.org
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promising models
LINKED LEARNING
Scope Model Outcomes
Linked Learning
programs are
being imple-
mented in high
schools in eleven
California school
districts through
the California
Linked Learning
District Initiative,
with support from
Connect Ed: The
California Center
for College and
Career. The
Linked Learning
model has been
adopted by many
California Partner-
ship Academies
and other Califor-
nia high schools. 
Linked Learning combines strong academic
curricula, technical education, and real-world
experience organized around broad industry
sectors such as bio-medical and health serv-
ices, construction and building design, agri-
culture and renewable resources, and arts,
media, and entertainment. The Linked Learn-
ing program consists of four essential com-
ponents: an academic core that satisfies the
course requirements for entry into California’s
public colleges and universities; a technical
component of three or more courses focusing
on knowledge and skill learning; a series of
project- or work-based learning opportunities;
and support services including supplemental
instruction, counseling, and transportation
services. The program emphasizes a teaching
approach that helps students make connec-
tions between theoretical learning and real-
world applications. The Linked Learning
model seeks to prepare all students for a
range of post-secondary and career options.
According to the UCLA Insti-
tute for Democracy, Educa-
tion, and Access (IDEA),
research evidence supports
the effectiveness of a Linked
Learning approach for increas-
ing achievement, decreasing
dropouts, preparing students
for college, and preparing stu-
dents for well-paying careers
and civic participation.
UCLA/IDEA is currently
preparing a case study of ten
California schools and pro-
grams that have successfully
implemented the Linked
Learning approach. 
Web
idea.gseis.ucla.edu/projects/
linked-learning
GENERATION SCHOOLS
Scope Model Outcomes
Brooklyn
Generation
High School
opened in
2007; two
new Gener-
ation high
schools will
open in
Denver in
2012.
The Generation Schools model aims to maxi-
mize instructional time for students and col-
laborative planning time for teachers by
reinventing the school day and year. At the
pilot Brooklyn Generation High School, all
teachers are responsible for ninety-minute
“Foundation” courses taught in the morn-
ing, keeping class sizes as low as fifteen stu-
dents; after lunch, students take larger
“Studio” elective courses. Teachers have two
hours of common planning time each day to
work in grade-level and subject-specific
teams. Twice a year, each grade-level team
has a three-week break and a full week to
plan together, develop curriculum, and
observe colleagues, while other teachers
teach their students in month-long “Inten-
sives” focused on college and career readi-
ness. The innovative schedule provides 200
days of instruction per year while limiting
teachers’ work year to the standard New York
City contractual length. 
According to Generation Schools,
while only 20 percent of Brooklyn
Generation’s entering ninth-graders
were on grade level four years ago,
nearly three quarters are on track to
graduate on-time and college-ready.
Attendance is 85 percent, despite the
longer school year. The New York City
Department of Education reported a
four-year graduation rate of 55 per-
cent for the first graduating class in
2011, below the citywide average of 61
percent but substantially higher than
the graduation rate of South Shore
High School, which Brooklyn Genera-
tion helped replace. According to
Generation Schools, 90 percent of
graduates were accepted to colleges.
Web
www.generationschools.org
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